Church Talk on Repentance

I gave this talk in church on January 15, 2012.

As one of the first four principles of the gospel, repentance can seem overwhelming. Elder Neal A. Maxwell states, “Repentance is a rescuing, not a dour doctrine.” That is, it is a positive, not a negative principle.

Repentance can often seem like a negative principle because it means casting off sins caused by ignorance, weakness, and willful disobedience. Ignorance, weakness, and willful disobedience can be rather overwhelming!

There is a process to help us deal with repentance: first, recognize the sin; next, feel sorrow for the sin (not merely the negative consequences of the sin but sorrow for the sin itself); then, forsake the sin, confessing it to Heavenly Father, another person (if necessary) and priesthood authority (if necessary); make restitution; forgive oneself and others; finally, continue to keep the commandments.

This is a good process. What is the purpose of this process? What are the different stages of the process attempting to achieve?

To illustrate the purpose of the process, I am going to compare events in the lives of two men: Joseph Smith and Alma the Younger.

Following the First Vision, during a three-year period, Joseph Smith states that he fell into “foolish errors and the weakness . . . and foibles of human nature” (JS-History 1:28). I’m sure we can all relate to that! Worried, he prayed that he might know of the state of his relationship with God.

Alma the Younger was persecuting the church when an angel appeared to him and commanded him to stop. The angel came to Alma the Younger in answer to the prayers of Alma’s father and members of the church.

These are two very different men. Joseph Smith was undergoing ordinary human failings. Alma the Younger, on the other hand, had actively turned his back on God.

However, both men underwent similar experiences. When Joseph Smith prayed, the angel Moroni appeared to him, and Joseph Smith was given a new mission: to locate and eventually translate the Book of Mormon.

After the angel appeared to Alma the Younger, he was unable to move or speak for two days. During that time, he had a vision. He explains what happened to him in that vision in Mosiah 27: 24-26.
24 For, said he, I have repented of my sins, and have been redeemed of the Lord; behold I am born of the Spirit.

25 And the Lord said unto me: Marvel not that all mankind, yea, men and women, all nations, kindreds, tongues and people, must be born again; yea, born of God, changed from their carnal and fallen state, to a state of righteousness, being redeemed of God, becoming his sons and daughters;

26 And thus they become new creatures; and unless they do this, they can in nowise inherit the kingdom of God.
Both Joseph Smith and Alma the Younger experienced a restart of their spiritual progression. Joseph Smith just needed to be revved out of stall while Alma the Younger actually needed to turn the car around—still, both of them underwent a renewal, a regeneration of their relationship with God.

This renewal or regeneration is referred to often in the scriptures. It is frequently compared to being reborn or receiving a new heart. Jeremiah 24:7 states that the Lord “will give us a heart to know him.” Ezekiel 18:31 states that we should “cast away transgressions . . . make [us] a new heart and spirit” while Ezekiel 36:26 includes a promise from the Lord: “[A] new spirit will I put within you: and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and will give you an heart of flesh.” An “heart of flesh” is a heart that is whole and responsive and can appreciate the love of God.

More examples! In Alma 5:26, Alma the Younger gives a sermon in which he wonders if his listeners have “experienced a change of heart and . . . felt to sing the song of redeeming love.”

And, of course, there is the famous passage in the New Testament when Nicodemus comes to see Jesus, and Jesus tells him that to enter into the kingdom of God, he must be “born again . . . of water and of the Spirit” (John 3:3,5).

Rebirth/a change of heart/softening heart: all these images have to do with renewal, regeneration, transformation. The purpose of repentance is not to just follow a list of instructions but to undergo a process that involves progression. Through repentance, we can lose our cynicism; we can gain optimism and feel renewed.

Another story about repentance takes a middle road in comparison to the earlier stories. Joseph Smith in the earlier story was suffering from ordinary human failings while Alma the Younger had actually turned away from God.

We often make mistakes that fall between these two points. One example comes again from Joseph Smith’s life. About the time he finished translating the first 116 pages of the Book of Mormon, Joseph Smith became friends with an older man, Martin Harris. Martin Harris was not only older but wealthier and better educated. He convinced Joseph Smith to give him the 116 pages to show to others. Joseph Smith agreed DESPITE several warnings through the Spirit that it was not a good idea.

The pages were stolen. Joseph Smith was devastated. He took the responsibility for the theft on himself, saying, “I . . . tempted the wrath of God. I should have been satisfied with the first answer which I received from the Lord; for he told me that it was not safe to let the writing go out of my possession” (Doctrine and Covenants Student Manual, "Section 3"). Doctrine & Covenants 3 tells us that Joseph Smith ignored the promptings of the Spirit because he feared man more than God. This is understandable; we all often do things that we know aren’t wise out of fear of disappointing a boss or friends or people who seem wiser in the ways of the world.

For a time, Joseph Smith lost his ability to translate, and he experienced a heavy heart. However, he repented and Doctrine & Covenants 10 tells us that he was forgiven. He regained his ability to translate and was commanded to continue in the work, to not run faster or labor more than he had strength, to be faithful and diligent, and to pray always.

Repentance brought Joseph Smith a renewal of his relationship with God; he was encouraged to keep going in the same direction.

Likewise, when we repent, we should accept and applaud the change of heart that comes with the process. In a March 1993 Ensign article, Joseph Walker writes:
Of course, this change of heart isn’t a once-in-a-lifetime thing. Nor is it intended only for those who are guilty of major violations of God’s law. It can come every day of our lives as we prayerfully consider our commitment to the Lord and the sacred covenants we have made with him. In doing so, sometimes we’ll feel the need to repent and improve. Other times we’ll feel the confident peace of purity, which in this life only comes through repentance. Those are the times when we will feel most inclined to “sing the song of redeeming love."(“Singing the Song of Redeeming Love”)

The purpose of repentance is to encourage renewal, so we feel like singing. The joy that accompanies the repentance process is one of its gifts.

I think we often have difficulty accepting the gifts of the repentance process. We go through the process, then immediately think, “Time for a break!” or “Got to start over, work on getting rid of another sin!”

I think we feel this way for several reasons--we are afraid of change; we feel we aren’t good enough to accept God’s gifts; we know we aren’t perfect (and we aren’t!); also, it can be difficult for humans to accept how truly forgiving and generous God can be.

The story of Jonah from the Old Testament is a good example of this. We’ve all heard of Jonah and the whale, but AFTER Jonah got out of the whale, he did what he was supposed to do in the first place: he went to the city of Ninevah to tell the inhabitants there that they would be destroyed for their sins.

Surprise! The inhabitants repented. Instead of being pleased, Jonah was upset. He left the city and sulked instead of rejoicing with those he helped. He actually sat outside of the city, hoping it would be destroyed. While he did this, God sent a vine to shade him from the sun, and Jonah was content to sit in the shade. But then God destroyed the vine, and Jonah started sulking again. At which point, God rebuked Jonah for being happier about the shade than about the city being saved. In other words, Jonah was rebuked for not taking pleasure in the process of repentance.

We need to be willing to participate in the gifts of repentance, to be optimistic and positive, because those gifts make future repentance easier. Just like it is easier to exercise when we feel upbeat, it is easier to repent when we have a positive attitude.

In contrast to Jonah, the Book of Mormon tells us of Ammon, one of the sons of Mosiah. He repented of his sins at the same time as Alma the Younger, and he and his brothers went on missions to the Lamanites. After their missions, they met up again, and Ammon spoke to his brothers about what they had been through:
Now have we not reason to rejoice? Yea, I say unto you, there never were men that had so great reason to rejoice as we, since the world began; yea, and my joy is carried away, even unto boasting in my God; for he has all power, all wisdom, and all understanding; he comprehendeth all things, and he is a merciful Being, even unto salvation, to those who will repent and believe on his name. (Alma 26:35, Kate’s emphasis)

What about that for a positive attitude?! Can’t you just feel his excitement?!

Now, we don’t always feel excited about repentance; many times, we have to do what Joseph Smith did and push ourselves out of stall. But if we keep the example of people like Ammon in mind, the process will be easier. If we remember that repenting means enjoying the gifts of repentance, we can use those gifts to help us through the process.

Repentance is happiness.

From Qirmizy to Crimson

One of my students, a young Muslim woman, was upset. Like many students, she spends her entire day on campus. Traditional Muslims pray several times a day, and the student was looking for a quiet corner. When she asked a campus employee for help, the employee replied, "Why not try the restroom?"

The student was offended. To her, the restroom is a place of waste, an unclean place—not a proper place for prayer. I understood her revulsion. At the same time, however, I understood the employee who made the suggestion. There are few quiet places on campus. To a non-Muslim, and secularized American, the restroom does not have unclean or degrading connotations. The employee was trying to problem-solve—propose a compromise.

The employee's suggestion was not the most tactful reply to the student's need, but it illustrates an important aspect of communication. Our backgrounds and cultures influence our comprehension. "Quiet" to one person includes a sacred nuance. To another person, it implies literal silence. What we hear is not necessarily what the other person means.

Not only does culture influence our understanding of language, the very structure of our "mother tongue" influences how we approach a new language. We cannot help but view the new language through pre-established expectations. We apply our expectations throughout the learning (acquisition) process as we hunt for similarities between the mother tongue (language 1) and the new language (language 2). This is called language transfer.

Language transfer is natural—although the field itself is filled with controversy. In my grammar classes, I encounter a growing number of ELL students whose "mother tongues" influence their understanding of English grammar. Many of these students are Sudanese; their first language is Arabic. As their teacher, I can assist the acquisition process by appreciating the role of language transfer, learning the structures and expectations of Arabic, and preparing tasks that take those expectations into account.

Language transfer is a complicated discipline. It seems self-evident that one's native language influences one's perception of Latin, French, English or Arabic. Controversies over language transfer cluster around the process of that influence. Some theorists argue that language transfer is largely behavioral and cultural (as illustrated by the above anecdote). More recently, language transfer theorists have applied statistical methodology to cases of language learning.

My primary interest is how the teacher should take language transfer into account, specifically in the study of grammar. S. Pit Corder's article "A Role for the Mother Tongue" can help the teacher recognize language transfer in the classroom as natural and even necessary. Corder (1992) argues with the original model of language transfer whereby the "mother tongue" interferes/inhibits the learner from grasping rules of the new language. Learning a language, Corder contends, is not like memorizing a list of structures. "[This notion]," he writes, "is . . . reinforced by the nature of the structural syllabus upon which our teaching programs have been for so long based" (pp. 21-22). Corder's article is more than ten years old, but his comments are still applicable today.

The process of learning a language is more complex than accumulating drills. Grammar rules in language 1 cannot be transferred directly to the grammar of language 2; people do not always learn languages progressively. Consider the difference between a second language learner who learns from a textbook (linearly) and the second language learner who lives amongst speakers of the second language. As common knowledge (and language students) testify, the latter group learns the language more rapidly and more idiomatically.

Corder, however, is concerned primarily with the process of language transfer (rather than the milieu). He argues that the "mother tongue" facilitates acquisition. He refers specifically to what he calls "performance phenomenon"—"borrowing." When a second language learner is under pressure, the learner will "borrow" or substitute words from the mother tongue (p. 26). Borrowing occurs because communication is the learner's primary goal, rather than obedience to grammar rules. This was true when I took French literature in college. After four years of high school French, I could read French fairly well but could not (and still cannot) speak it without serious embarrassment. During class, the professor wanted us to use French to discuss the day's assigned reading. Inevitably, I would start out, "Je connais . . . " but within moments, I would fall back into English. I was reverting, not borrowing. Borrowers retrieve words and structures from the mother tongue to help their developing sense of the second language (Corder, 26). In both cases, however, being understood is the primary goal.

Corder's article is helpful to any teacher of ELL students. Since grammar courses are designed to be "cumulative"—to borrow Corder's term—such courses contain strong expectations that students will learn a concept and then move on. It is always disconcerting when students, both native and non-native speakers, continue to make errors covered in earlier lessons. An individual's internal understanding of a language is not nearly as systematic as grammar workbooks would have teachers believe.

Corder also makes clear that language transfer is not an equation. Many times, language 1 does not contain forms or concepts that can be transferred to language 2. It is hopeless to search for feminine and masculine articles (le/la) in English. English capital letters find no equivalent in Arabic. Learning a language does not mean forcing the mother tongue to conform to a new set of rules. A new language is its own entity.

Arabic and English, for example, have many differences. The differences are ingrained, not superficial. Arabic has no modal verbs (can, could, may, might, will, would) and also no form of "to be" in the present tense (am, is, are) (Swan & Smith, 2001, pp. 201, 203-204). I encounter errors in these areas when I correct essays by my Sudanese students. One student wrote, "[T]he demon didn't like my mother because she Christian." The same student combined a modal verb with a noun: "getting marriage" and "could get marriage" Another student produced a similar error, writing, "[I]t had never been snow."

Other transfer issues surround prepositions. Arabic contains prepositions, but not all Arabic prepositions can be "transferred" directly into English, either in terms of usage or purpose (Swan & Smith, 2001, pp. 206-207). Unnecessary prepositions occur in my students' essays: "[F]or the first day I got here, I did not like [the cold]." "After 25 years later, my great-grandfather die." "[I]t gives more opportunity to the people to be able to work." In all instances, the extra preposition or prepositional phrase is added for the sake of emphasis.

Understanding these types of errors, and why they occur, can help the grammar teacher appreciate what challenges Arabic-speaking students face. When I look over my students' essays, I am impressed by how many times they experimented, unconsciously or consciously, with grammar structures; they were creating what language transfer theorists call an "interlanguage," or developmental language.

Keeping ELL students in mind, the grammar teacher should prepare lessons which teach the existence of the grammar rule, not simply the application. Sandra Fotos stresses this approach in her chapter "Structure-Based Interactive Tasks for the EFL Grammar Learner" in New Perspectives on Grammar Teaching in Second Language Classrooms. Fotos (2002) compares implicit instruction with explicit instruction. In implicit instruction, such as the communicative approach, students are exposed to examples of writing that use certain grammar rules (p. 136). The communicative approach rests on the idea that grammar structures occur in context, not in the "ordered lists" criticized by Corder. Certainly, the communicative approach has a place in grammar curriculums. Yet Fotos cites research where "learners benefit from formal instruction prior to meaning-focused activities because such instruction promotes their attention to the forms they will encounter" (p. 137). Learners need explicit instruction to help them focus.

Corder and promoters of the communicative approach are not wrong when they argue that acquiring a language is not a systematic act. However, the need for explicit instructions in the classroom is clear. Just as explaining the rules and then moving on to the next chapter is not enough, presenting material and leaving students to their own devices is not fruitful. Fotos' solution is "structure-based interactive tasks" that combine implicit and explicit instruction. She focuses mainly on EFL classrooms—where English is taught not for daily use (as a second language) but in order to pass a test or move on to another level (much as I learned French in high school)—but her task types can be used in ESL or regular grammar courses. In the first task type, students use a targeted grammar principle to complete an activity (p. 144). In the second task type, students must complete a meaning-based problem using correct grammar (p. 145).

Fotos' standard for these tasks comes from Peter Skehan. According to Skehan, a task should (1) communicate primarily through meaning; (2) present a problem to be solved; (3) have real world application; (4) resolve with (5) a measurable performance (Fotos, p. 140). Using both Fotos and Skehan's recommendations, I created two tasks for the lesson, "Helping Verbs." I chose this lesson because of its possible pitfalls for Arabic speakers. The tasks will be aimed at that group.
Introduction to Tasks:

There are three types of verbs in English: action verbs, linking verbs, and helping verbs. Helping verbs include the following: be, being, been, am, are, is, was, were, do, does, did, have, had, has, shall, should, can, could, will, would, may, might, must.

Shall, should, can, could, will, would, may, might, must are also called "modals."

Not all languages have helping verbs or modals. In English, helping verbs are used to say whether something took place in the past or will take place in the future:
We have seen the movie already. (We saw the movie in the past.)
I will go to the ballgame tomorrow. (I go in the future)
Modals are used to suggest a possibility or a necessity:
I may walk the dog.
I should feed the cat.
HELPING VERBS ARE ALWAYS USED WITH BASE VERBS. The base verb is usually an action verb. Find the action verbs in the above sentences (go, see, walk, feed).

Task I: Combining helping verbs and base or action verbs

Using helping verbs, students must complete the phrases on the board:
I _____ going to the mall this afternoon.
I ______ spoken to the lawyer about the will.
He ______ thinking about selling his boat.
We ______ wish to visit the memorial.
They ________ planning a picnic for Friday.
You ________ tell me if the parade cancels.

(Again, the base verbs are "go," "speak," "think," "wish," "plan," "tell.")

Task 2: Teaching the modal

Pass out pictures of people from magazines.

Students should write a paragraph about what their person will do in the future. (Hint: use "will," "shall.")

Students should then write a paragraph about what their person ought to do in the future. (Hint: use "should," "may," "might," "must.")
Analysis of Tasks

The first task uses explicit instruction. The students are required to finish incomplete sentences with the correct form of a helping verb. To emphasize that the helping and base verb go together, the teacher and students could use a specific color pen for the verbs.

The task should emphasize the use of helping verbs in both the past and present tense. When reviewing the answers, the teacher should point out the possibility of several right answers ("He is thinking about selling his boat." "He was thinking . . ."). The teacher should not single out students who answer wrongly. Rather, the teacher should show why an answer is wrong. If a student writes, "We have wish," for example, the teacher could talk about tense forms. If a student writes, "I am spoken," the teacher could talk about subject-verb agreement.

The second task uses implicit instruction. There are no modal verbs in Arabic. However, in all cultures, people think about the future, and people give advice. Task 2 parlays that natural human tendency into the correct use of "modals." Like many grammar rules, modals are difficult to explain at a purely definitional level; the words "would," "should" and "must" represent differing degrees of necessity, but the nuances are slight, even to native speakers. Practice is the best guide here. In order to make the second task more relevant, the teacher could substitute a real person for the picture person: "What do you think your sibling should do in the future?"

Conclusion

Learning a new language can be a stressful event. Even the best-prepared teacher will encounter problems unconnected, on the surface, to grammar, sentence structure, and vocabulary. In their introduction to Language Transfer in Language Learning, editors Susan Gass and Larry Selinker (1992) list various factors in learning a new language: "age . . . motivation, loyalty to a language, language aptitude, and attitude" (p. 4). Teachers cannot cancel out these factors, but they can, hopefully, lessen the uneasiness or fear felt by most language learning students. Teachers can be alert to "transfers" and "borrowings" that students may make as they acquire the new language.

The teacher can use interactive tasks based on Fotos' model. Both explicit and implicit instructions are necessary in the classroom; explicit and implicit tasks encourage students to focus and to apply their learning. The teacher should emphasize not just the necessity but the usability of correct grammar.

Teachers need to keep ELL students in mind, whether or not they teach ESL classes. Within just the last year, the number of Sudanese and Somalian students in my classes has nearly doubled. Many of these students have not taken ESL classes. Their level of acquisition varies greatly. I have had students with almost no verbal skills, and students who use American-English idioms without effort. I have had students who cannot write complete sentences, and students who write nearly flawless English. In all cases, I have to keep in mind what aspects of English may cause the most confusion for my students. Some problems, like run-on sentences and fragments, apply to all students (all the time!), but other issues, such as the use of helping verbs, the use of prepositions, and the use of capital letters are specific to my Sudanese and Arabic-speaking students. I will not be able to address every issue that my students face but hopefully, I can make English more accessible to them while I encourage them to enjoy the wonderful language they are learning.

References follow. This research paper was written for an education course. An analysis of the course can be found at Votaries of Horror.

References

Corder, S. Pit (1992). A role for the mother tongue. In S. Gass & L. Selinker (Eds.), Language Transfer in Language Learning. (pp. 18-31). Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Fotos, Sandra (2002). Structure-based interactive tasks for the EFL grammar learner. In E. Hinkle & S. Fotos (Eds.), New Persepctives on Grammar Teaching in Second Language Classrooms. (pp. 135-154). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Gass, Susan M. & Selinker, Larry (Eds.). (1992). Language Transfer in Language Learning. Revised Edition. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Hinkle, Eli & Fotos, Sandra (Eds.). (2002). Perspectives on Grammar Teaching in Second Language Classrooms. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Student papers (names withheld), Introduction to College Writing, Fall 2006.

Swan, Michael & Smith, Bernard (Eds.). (2001). Arabic speakers. In Learner English. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reflective Paper for Teaching Class

In order to get certified, I am currently taking "Teaching the Exceptional Student in the Classroom" which is code for "learning the law regarding children with disabilities and special needs so the school doesn't get sued." I will be posting the occasional paper from that class. The paper below has to do with the problem of inclusion. Inclusion is the idea that instead of sequestering children with disabilities, they should be included in mainstream classes (the proper term is "general" classroom). I have very mixed feelings about this, not because I am opposed to inclusion but because the philosophy behind it seems so demanding.
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The philosophy of inclusion is enlightened and enchanting in its possibilities. However, like so many abstract concepts, implementation can prove difficult. I have a great deal of sympathy for teachers who are put off by both the complications of special education law and by the demands of implementation. I agree with Debi Smith and Betty Bolte (Smith, 48) that collaboration is the best solution, although collaboration can produce complications as well.

My teaching experience is mostly at the college level-—I currently teach English at both Southern Maine Community College and Andover College-—although I have substituted at the high school level and in resource rooms. In the college setting, I deal mostly with learning disabilities rather than physical impairments or mental retardation. My following comments rise mostly out of perceived obstacles encountered by elementary and high school teachers; some of my comments deal with the end result-—what I encounter at the college level.

I believe in teaching. I believe in the necessity of conveying basic instruction to people of all ages and all backgrounds. It is very exciting to develop and utilize different techniques in order to connect with a wide range of students. Yet I am increasingly frustrated by how much teaching has morphed, even at the college level, into social management. Teachers have always had to deal with administrative issues, but current teachers seem to be self-contained CEOs, required to keep afloat a multitude of meetings, legal requirements, collaborative sessions, interventions, supervisions, mediations, anything and everything except teaching. Students benefit socially and emotionally from such a well-organized system, but the educational fall-out can be severe. I find it profoundly disturbing how little my 20-year-old students know about basic writing and grammar even while they expect constant supervision and direction. It worries me how little they are willing to think on their own.

Furthermore, I wonder how many potential teachers-—people who know how to communicate ideas and ground students in fundamental concepts-—are put off by the expectations of inclusion. The law itself can be rather daunting, especially since teachers are so exposed to public criticism. I worked as a secretary for ten years. Being a secretary is a hard job; you are at the beck and call of others, yet even as a receptionist, I was never answerable, performance-wise, to more than three people. Now, I have seventy people with some say in how I teach. That doesn't include the heads of my departments, college administrations, accreditation committees, students' parents (not as big a concern in the college environment, thank goodness). Consequently, I've developed a thicker skin, but I've never been able to shake the vague uneasiness that accompanies any environment with multiple rules. I would never purposefully ignore a legal requirement, such as finding a note taker for a student. But suppose, through lack of communication, I failed to follow through on such a request? What would happen to me? Students have sued colleges; suppose, unintentionally, I leave my department open to such an action?

Teachers bear the brunt of many of our culture's expectations and, consequently, are expected to perform duties that go beyond teaching. I want desperately for my students to reach their educational goals: write a clear essay, use correct punctuation, properly research information. In order to help them reach these goals, I have to accommodate different learning styles while keeping the class involved and on-task. It can be very difficult, and I cannot imagine running the kind of classroom envisioned in Teaching Students with Special Needs where all mental, physical and cultural diversities are simultaneously recognized and celebrated (Smith, 41). Teachers do get to know their students (better, I sometimes think, than the students realize), but understanding is difficult enough amongst our closest friends and relatives; to expect that level of understanding from teachers towards all of their students regarding all aspects of their students' lives seems, well, a bit demanding.

That being said, the philosophy of inclusion is the right philosophy, and legal efforts on behalf of children with special needs are right and commendable. It does not surprise me that children with disabilities do better when incorporated into general education classrooms. During one of my subbing jobs in a resource room, I witnessed a young woman of nineteen with severe retardation (possibly Down syndrome). She was the oldest student in the room. Throughout the day, she became repeatedly belligerent and aggressive. She cheered up when a senior from a general education class came in; she addressed the senior by name in a pleased, excited voice. At some level, she must have felt the wrongness of being nineteen and yet removed from students close to her in age. I felt rather limp and ineffectual (even more than the usual substitute blues); she was so frustrated, yet unable to articulate her frustration. And yet, after all, what could anyone do? She attended general education classes, but her disability was severe enough that she spent a lot of time in the resource room. The resource room concentrated on both teaching and life skills, and she returned to the room mostly for the latter. Although the resource room staff (there must have been about five of them overall) struck me as somewhat patronizing, they were also reasonable and patient and, quite frankly, I didn't have to deal with the young woman everyday. (The aggressiveness was a daily occurrence.)

I think this indicates the crux of uneasiness over inclusion: how much is enough? There is always something to be done, and ideally, we should always try to make people's lives better. Realistically, money is a concern; time is a concern; resources are a concern. And they will always be concerns; even if every school in the country had all the money it asked for, such concerns would still arise: human needs and desires are limitless; money and time and resources will always run short.
With that in mind, I am a huge advocate of peer support. I have found that group learning can be quite effective. There are always students in my classes who never speak and students who answer every single question; there are students who have difficulty motivating themselves, and students who are self-motivators. When I mix up the groups (and mix them up good, so the students aren't simply grouped with their neighbors), the outcome is always better. The mix leads to collaboration. Students encourage each other, learn about each other, and exchange ideas. Also, since teaching is the best way to learn, encouraging high performance students to teach low performance students can keep the high performance students engaged.

Collaboration is the key to inclusion. I promote peer support, rather than professional collaboration, simply because it seems more accessible. But consultation with colleagues is always helpful. Some of the best teaching advice I've received came from other adjuncts. Many times, they have been-there-done-that and can suggest possible solutions.

Collaboration is necessary for any teacher, and constant collaboration, especially for elementary school teachers, who are isolated from their peers, is vital. The dark side to collaboration is that it depends on other people: other people's availability; other people's understanding; other people's agreement; other people's personalities! Ms. Moffett's First Year by Abby Goodnough records the tension between a new first grade teacher and the school's principal. Ms. Moffett, the teacher, is inexperienced but committed and wants to try different teaching techniques. The principal considers Ms. Moffett's ideas foolish and unnecessary; she is more concerned with a stable and well-disciplined classroom. Ms. Moffett comes off as somewhat naïve, but a principal with a different personality might have understood Ms. Moffett's intentions and encouraged her creativity rather than squashing it.

But then, all schools could use perfect principals as well as perfect teachers. And that isn't possible. To be honest, my primary reaction to Teaching Students was exhaustion. How can anyone live up to these ideals? I understand the necessity of complying with the law, and I commend the promotion of inclusive classrooms, but I sure wish Teaching had a less rose-colored view of the issues at hand. How about stories where things didn't work out? However, perhaps the authors are right; disillusionment has never been a particularly good instruction tool. Inclusion is important as well as collaboration, and teachers should attempt to live up to those ideals, no matter how often they fall below the mark.

Book: Teaching Students with Special Needs in Inclusive Settings by Tom E.C. Smith et al. 4th edition. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006.

THESIS: Introduction

Here it is! Concerning my purpose in writing the thesis (other than wanting to graduate), the Introduction, which follows, is more or less self-explanatory. Suffice it to say, This is my attempt to bring into the academic study of literature, the kind of in-depth and enthusiastic discussions that fans carry on everyday. And no, unfortunately, I couldn't just say that and be done.

I would like to thank my friends and family with whom I have held many, many in-depth and enthusiastic discussions about, well, everything, but especially about books, films and television shows. Any experiential authority I might have in this area is due to you.

Please feel free to comment, only not, I beg you, on textual errors. At this point, as the thesis is being bound and stuck somewhere in the USM library, I really don't want to know. To reach me, e-mail: woodburykate@yahoo.com

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Inside Knowledge: Votary Theory at Work

People who are fond of books know the feeling of
irritation which sweeps over them [when disturbed].
The temptation to be unreasonable and
snappish is one not easy to manage.
The Little Princess by Frances Hodgson Burnett

The first time I forgot myself while reading was in second grade. I barely remember the book now, except that it was an easy reader and about a cat. I do remember that I became so absorbed, I was late for school lunch. It was the beginning of many years of inattentiveness. Ten years later, I would get moved to the front of eleventh grade math for reading Jean Auel's Clan of the Cave Bears during class. Upon entering the work force as a secretary, I learned never to bring interesting books to my desk. I was liable to bark, "What do you want?" to interrupting supervisors.

My enthrallment with books started before I learned to read myself. I was read to as a child, mostly by my mother, who also told me fairytales, including her own (about a troll named Milo). I developed a predisposition then for audio performances. I would also act out the stories I heard. I would experiment mentally, and physically, with crafting fictions: if you change all the female characters in Cinderella to male and the male characters to female, does it alter the story? Suppose a certain event, crucial to the original text, does not occur? Suppose we add a character--what happens then? Story was a real as well as a made thing.

Despite growing up without a television, I was surrounded by performances: ballet (my sister Ann's interest), plays in the park--Shakespeare, Oscar Wilde--opera, symphonies, Peter, Paul & Mary, black & white oldies (shown at the old-style, downtown theater), Star Wars, The Cat from Outer Space. Once I bought a television at the age of twenty-six, I became equally enamoured with commercials, sitcoms and television dramas (Criminal Minds, Buffy, Star Trek). The remarkable aspect of my youth, however, was not the plethora of art to which I was exposed but the fact that so little of it was accompanied by any valuation.

Sincere Marxists and semiologists will insist that I did unwittingly receive the valuations of a dominant culture. A Caucasian female living in upstate New York, I was inculcated through the shows I attended, the radio I listened to, and the movies I watched with images, icons and concepts that supported and furthered the agendas, opinions, values of my white, middle class culture. The equation is complicated somewhat by the fact that I am a Mormon and was raised as one, but nevertheless, I am, in fact, Anglo and middle class.

Suffice it to say that defending my Anglo, middle class upbringing was not a factor of my childhood. I never needed to defend anything I read to anyone. We went to see Shakespeare because my parents like Shakespeare not because he was valuable or important or canonized. We also went to see the aforementioned Star Wars and scads of Little League baseball games. Every event was approached with the same interest, humor and post-show analysis. The idea of placing books or playwrights or films into hierarchies was never addressed, nor were the books, plays and films linked to political or social agendas. I am still flummoxed when I run across readers who equate their particular likes and dislikes with membership in a specific political party.(Footnote 1) Most importantly, my reactions--despite the post-show analysis--were never formalized or made relevant. No one asked me if I'd caught the symbolism in C.S. Lewis' Narnia series (my comprehension of the symbolism was taken for granted); no one asked me what Shakespeare meant to me. (A lot.) And certainly, no one ever asked me if I intended the novels of Orson Scott Card to form a life-long interdisciplinary reading pattern between religion and science-fiction, although that kind of happened anyway.

Subsequently, upon entering college, I experienced a minor shock. In retrospect, the Humanities program at Brigham Young University in 1989 was, if anything, geared towards formalism, even New Criticism; formalism, I don't mind; what I wasn't prepared for was the high-mindedness attached to literature and the subsequent politics that accompanied that high-mindedness. Reading literature did not just mean that one learned a great deal about the Romantics, Beowulf and Maya Angelou. It gave one clout of sorts. If one read Henry V, one could make comments about the Gulf War. Or women's rights. Or anything.

It occurred to me that the humanities was fighting a desperate, and rearguard, action against the hard and soft scientists who did use their disciplines to comment on such things as women's rights or, in the case of the hard scientists, to address the provable workings of the universe (all while we humanities scholars were nitpicking nuances in The Tale of Genji). Justification for one's discipline appeared to be tied to one's ability to slather the outcomes of that discipline onto the rest of the world. Hence the desire by humanities students, and professors, to use their Insights Into Human Nature to Say Profound Things. Which seemed, to my twenty-year-old mind, unbelievably dumb. I gravitated towards professors who emphasized authorial intent and historical context and who were, as well, overwhelming engaged by their particular specialties (I am happy to say that they were there to find). In the meantime, I developed, as twenty-year-olds are wont to do, a Theory in which I condemned every artistic work that meant something. Author makes statement equals bad literature, I decided.

That lasted right up until I realized that I'd condemned C.S. Lewis and Dostoevsky amongst others. I tried to fit exceptions into my theory and then gave it up. But my dissatisfaction with the search for Meaning or Purpose in literature remained, a dissatisfaction that has been exacerbated by current trends in critical theory. The compulsion by humanities students to Talk About Life appears to have intensified in the last ten years. In issuing pronouncements on race, class and gender, the humanities discipline appears more and more like an extension of the Sociology Department, its language a blend of labels and jargon and a rather excessive use of the word "ideology."

Power lies at the core of this abandonment of aesthetics for "relevance." As in the game of hot potato, humanities students breathlessly follow the exchange of power from discipline to discipline, group to group. Now, women have it (who will get it next? where did it go?). Now, it's back to the white males. Oops, it crossed over to the resistant ideology. Nope, the dominant ideology snatched it back. A discipline intended for the study and enjoyment of literature has turned works of art into sociological springboards--what can we do with Jane Austen? Do we love her because she is a feminist? Do we loathe her because she isn’t feminist enough?--a type of blatant self-promotion fraught with irony, considering the anti-capitalistic tendencies of humanities departments. Straightforward commodification would bother me less, but I refuse to hand Pamela over to scholars who will claim great insight while deploying Pamela in their gender wars. (Although to be fair, I doubt Richardson would have minded.)

Where, I wonder, are the scholars who love literature just because it is literature? Who don't need to dismantle it or politicize it or defend it in terms of "real-life applications?" Who experience, as Roland Barthes called it, jouissance, the fun of the thing. I know these scholars exist. I have myself been in thrall to artistic works, in love with words, images, dialogue, faces. Moreover, I have encountered amongst my friends and relations (and through them, other lovers of artistic works) a fondness for entering fictional worlds. My friends and family and I will discuss film and novel characters as real people, not bothering to preface our remarks with "according to the author" or "as seen through our eyes." I have also witnessed a flexible and objective independence by which fans will reject an event within the "canon" story because it doesn't ring true while remaining faithful to the author/director's overall characterizations and design.(Footnote 2)

Too often, this type of creative involvement is perceived by humanities scholars as a nice, but useless, side-effect, not the principal response to the arts under discussion.(Footnote 3) Again and again, they return to the value of a work as a source of historical, sociological, even personal change. In her book on the Oprah Book Club, Kathleen Rooney echoes an idea common amongst many scholars (and readers) when she writes, "[I]n many cases the very impulse to read [amongst high brow and low brow readers] may very well be delineated in terms of . . . . self-improvement." It is foolish, Rooney argues, to attack Oprah for doing the very thing promoted by academe. She continues, "One of the things--but certainly not the only thing--genuinely good books can do for us as readers is inspire us to higher levels of morality, in the sense that they put us through the paces of moral awareness and affiliation, and disaffiliation." Rooney, I should state, makes a valiant effort to not reduce the literary search for self-improvement to mere platitudes or lessons. Nevertheless, her attitude that literature should mean or do something--should feed us in a practical rather than creative way--is at the root of not only Oprah's Book Club but contemporary academic approaches to the arts.(Footnote 4)

The search for a usable purpose in the arts is hardly new to Western Civilization. It extends back as far as Plato. Many groups and cultures consider that the arts are only palatable if they contain a moral lesson. However, the issue I wish to address is not, Do people believe that art should educate? but, What is the job of the humanities scholar in regards to the arts? Is it our job to fight over artistic works, pushing and molding them until they say the "right" kinds of things, the things we personally approve of and hold important, insightful and necessary to society? Should every production of Taming of the Shrew be preceded by a lecture on the evils of chauvinism, or, contrariwise, on the resistant aspects of feminist ideology? Are humanities scholars condemned forever to hold the position of cultural judges: this is acceptable because it addresses race, class and gender; this isn't acceptable because it promotes capitalism and other nefarious ideologies?

I hope not. I believe the job of the humanities scholar is to understand an artistic work on a creative level. Political commentary, gender commentary, social commentary may be entertaining, but they are not our primary responsibility. Rather, the artistic works of any age--be they popular, middlebrow, classical or indeterminate--are themselves the scholar's responsibility: a wide and deep area, hence the need for specialties. Our responsibility is not one of judgment, although judgment is not always out of place. Rather, our responsibility is to acknowledge, comprehend and just plain care about artistic works--literature, plays, poems, films: the outpouring of creativity throughout the ages.(Footnote 5) We should learn their contexts, learn how they have been used, how analyzed. We should understand their audiences. Most importantly, we should look for the creative desire, manifested throughout these works, in both the artist and in the reader/spectator.

Once again, hopefully with more success that when I was twenty, I have developed a theory. In this case, the theory is meant as a tool, a way of approaching artistic works that will address them at the creative level. I call this tool votary theory.(Footnote 6) Votary theory, while not ignoring historical or social realities (the influence of context), focuses on the creativity within artistic works rather than on their power-related or usable applications (social, political, personal). More precisely, votary theory postulates that power is not, in fact, the overwhelming determinant that so many critical theorists suppose. People do not watch plays, read books, listen to music, go to movies for the sake of reinforcing political (and therefore power-ful or power-less) positions. Finally, votary theory presents a set of tools with which to address individual works. Hopefully, through votary theory, the worst excesses of critical theory can be avoided. Artistic works should never be subsumed by signifiers, ideologies or political labels, languages that do almost anything except understand the things they describe.
1. A secretary (and political science major) I once worked with informed me that Republicans don't like Harry Potter. Since I know a number of Republicans and since most of them have read and liked Rowlings' books, I was at a loss as how to answer. "Uh…."

2. Many Buffy fans were upset by a last minute cancelled wedding that occurred in the second to last season. As a result, some fans, like myself, re-imagined the script to accommodate the unexpected ending while others simply ignored the event as "non-canon"; however, no fan abandoned the story line for that season as a whole. Like it or not, the characters didn't get married.

3. Reader response theorists being the notable exception. The current trend in reader response, however, is largely sociological, i.e., Elizabeth Long's Book Clubs: Women and the Uses of Reading in Everyday Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) and Janice Radway's Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Literature (Chapel Hill: University of North Caroline Press, 1984, reprinted 1991).

4. Kathleen Rooney, Reading With Oprah: The Book Club That Changed America (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 2005), 76. "[T]ruly great novels," Rooney writes in the same chapter, "result not only from an author's intellectual, political, social and cultural seriousness"--yikes!--"but also from an author's ability to evoke a kind of enigmatic, philosophical and almost spiritual quality," 98-99.

5. There is a beautiful passage in Umberto Eco's Name of the Rose (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1980) in which the narrator imagines books conversing through time: "Now I realized that not infrequently books speak of books: it is as if they spoke among themselves . . the library seemed all the more disturbing to me. It was then the place of a long, centuries-old murmuring, an imperceptible dialog between one parchment and another, a living thing, a receptacle of powers not to be ruled by a human mind, a treasure of secrets emanated by many minds, surviving the death of those who had produced them or had been their conveyors," 342-343.

6. My use of the term "votary" comes from a 1946 review of The Duchess of Malfi by Brooks Atkinson in which he refers to playgoers as "votaries of horror." I prefer "votary" to "fan," not because my conceptualization of a votary is very different from that of a fan but because "fan" carries a somewhat single-minded/popular culture connotation. I needed a broader term.

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 is the boring chapter. There are a few zingers, but you have to hunt for them. However, Chapter 1 was necessary to the thesis; here, I attempt three things: (1) to prove to my professors that I know enough (just) about critical theory to get away with inventing a new theory; (2) to establish the background to which I am responding; (3) to establish the axioms of votary theory, namely that people are individuals and individuals have creative desires.

If you are thinking, "You had to defend the idea that people have personal likes and dislikes over art? Are you kidding me!?" . . . you and me both, baby, you and me both.

*****************************************
Votary Theory

After a lecture of my own I have been accompanied
from Mill Lane to Magdalene by a young man
protesting with real anguish and horror against
my wounding, my vulgar, my irreverent
suggestion that The Miller's Tale was
written to make people laugh.
Experiment in Criticism by C.S. Lewis

The humanities often becomes obsessed with the desire to be relevant. This desire takes two forms: relativistic interpretations based upon personal or sociopolitical demands (and often completely unrelated to the text); and, cultural interpretations in which the text or performance becomes merely a peephole into its surrounding milieu, supplying the scholar with pedantic, often power-oriented, lessons about a time-period or culture. In the first case, context--the author's intent, the work's historicity, its relationship to other works--is lost; the work becomes no more or less deconstructable than a car manual. In the second case, the work becomes little more than evidence for other concerns, of little worth in its own right. In both cases, the work is robbed of its creative essence. It is my hope that votary theory will help the humanities scholar approach artistic works with balance; more importantly, it will enable the scholar to focus on the creative strengths, or weaknesses, of an artistic work and on the creative desire that connects that work to its audience.

The relationship between historic context and creativity must first be addressed. Picture a container, a plastic glass from Wal-Mart or Target, the kind that is sold with summer patio items. It is tall, colored with pastel stripes or dots. This glass can hold lemonade or iced tea, water or soda: a host of liquids. It would not be wise to fill it with especially hot items; the plastic has a tendency to melt.

The container represents context; it is empirical in nature, composed of proof held together by narrative or theory. It morphs--these glasses tend to crack, chip and warp slightly with the passage of time, although they are surprisingly hardy--and its base rests on an ideal: that history can and should be submitted to the strictures of responsible evidence.

The glass's content is much more variable and far less definite. It is personal, emotional, creative, qualities difficult to quantify. But no matter how abstract, the content must fit the glass. It is not wise, or responsible, to pour into the glass a flood of expectations which the glass is not equipped to handle; another container should be found. Likewise, we must accept that our desires about the past must fit their proper contexts. The very real creativity of Shakespeare is not exchangeable with the very real creativity of Arthur Miller. William Wordsworth and T.S. Eliot could not have walked in each other's shoes. Steven Spielberg is not Homer with a slightly different schtick (although that may be debatable).

Thus the relationship, in votary theory, between historical context and the creative act. Votary theory focuses ultimately on the artist's and audience's creative desire, an ineffable, indeterminate quality, difficult to categorize; yet that quality must fit its container, its moment of occurrence. In this way, even something as relativistic and theoretical as creativity can be held to a standard of proof. It is customary to assume, for example, that the opinions we hold in the present are opinions we would hold in another time. We are tempted to believe that a tolerant twenty-first century liberal would behave with tolerance and liberalism in the seventeenth century. It is far more likely that the expression of a similar state of mind would occur. From this perspective, the blue-state horror of gun-toting and overly religious red states has a far closer emotional link with the Puritan fear of displeased, displaced and (uniquely) religious Native Americans than with any Quaker-like tendencies from the same time period.

This does not negate the presence of tolerance (or paranoia) in either the blue-state or the Puritan; rather, it points to differing modes of expression. Likewise, votary theory postulates the existence of a creative desire which, like envy, happiness, trust and love, appears over and over in historically unique guises. Further, votary theory, while not proposing an absence of political considerations, suggests that the creative desire may have more influence within history than is usually credited. Through votary theory, an aesthetic appreciation of a work within its historical moment may be achieved. This is accomplished by focusing not on the work's purpose or the reader's use of the work, but on the reader/spectator as he or she exists inside the work.

Votary theory begins with an acceptance of a work's audience as composed of individuals; an individual engages an artistic work in a particular time and place, crafting a position within that work in order to enjoy its creative reality. Unlike reader response, votary theory does not examine the linear engagement between the reader/spectator and the work: the ways by which the reader processes a text, accepting or rejecting signifiers, information, themes. Neither does votary theory focus on the use that individuals make of artistic works (social, political, personal). Rather, votary theory focuses on the reader/spectator within the artistic work, the creative experience rather than the self-referential one. Readers/spectators willingly enter an author's creation, suspending other desires or impulses for the sake of the experience. How they behave within the work--whether they feel at home there, whether they wish to remain, to return--is the concern of votary theory. The reader as an historical being bears on the experience of engagement but the historical relevance of the work should excite the humanities scholar less than whether, and how, the reader's creative desires were satisfied.

In order to explicate this concept, it is first necessary to defend the individual as a creative agent since positioning within a work cannot be accomplished, or discussed, en masse. Without agreement at this fundamental level, the humanities scholar will not be able to utilize the tools offered by votary theory. If the individual experience of an artistic work doesn't matter, then social/political commentary is the only thing left to us and the humanities may as well relinquish its responsibility towards the arts to the manipulations of sociology. Votary theory, therefore, attempts not only to provide a tool of understanding but to defend the creative experience at an individual level.

The Individual as Agent

The individual as agent, and, specifically, the individual as a creative agent is often dismissed by theorists as naïve and jejeune, an old-time attitude of Western civilization long outgrown. Few contemporary scholars go so far as the Frankfurt School, which perceived mass culture as modern bread and circuses, entertainment designed to distract the lower orders from the ennui and dissatisfaction of the capitalistic system. Yet many scholars, including structuralists and postmodernists, remain surprisingly wedded to the concept that something is going on within mass culture other than personal enjoyment. The "something else" is either resistance or citizenship.

In the first case, resistance, scholars hope to awaken the masses--Brechtian-like-- to read "against the text." Popular culture becomes legitimate the more it is perceived as adversarial, attacking the dominant culture rather than reinforcing it. "[M]ass culture," Dana Polan wrote in 1986, "has become one of culture studies' most recurrent Others--a repository and a stereotypic cause of all the social ills of life under capitalism."(Footnote 1) If scholars can prove instead that popular works undermine the conventions of the dominant culture, freeing audiences from society's capitalistic mantle, such works will gain legitimacy as academic topics. In many ways, such scholarship is similar to the treatment of Harry Potter by occasional Christian fundamentalists; to avoid condemning the popular children's series as tainted by black magic, they interpret the texts as Christian, replete with allegorical significance. In both cases, mass or popular culture performs an acceptably edifying function. That a revelatory and edifying mass culture might also bore people to death hardly matters in the face of enlightenment.

Communal resistance, followed by communal enlightenment, is only possible once the individual--idiosyncratic, sometimes irrational, wholly self-interested--is annihilated from the equation. Once that occurs, all responses become social responses, shared constructions which collectively sway the ship of culture one way or another. Theorists--who are as capable of discussing themselves as they are of discussing others--are not unaware of the flaw in this conception. If responses to art are socially constructed, then our understanding of those responses is also socially constructed. Roland Barthes himself drew a line between popular culture which evades the dominant ideology and popular culture which addresses it, either in acceptance or rejection; but post-post-modernists (if not Barthes himself) would point out that all of Barthes' arguments are drawn from a similar source and background: Western critical thought.(Footnote 2)

In recent years, theories about culture have drifted from the exposure of mass conventions to the shared social aspects of artistic works. In his book Re-Reading Popular Culture, Joke Hermes argues that popular culture provides a powerful form of citizenship which reaches across class, race and gender, including as well as excluding. He is less interested in deconstructing popular culture than in watching it at work in society. Popular culture becomes a resource for shared expression and dialogue. It is also a disciplinary force, with negative and positive effects.(Footnote 3)

Other scholars, noting the interdisciplinary threads of cultural research, have stressed that culture is complex: non-reducible to one theory, structure or set of signs. They examine the multiple interactions between a production and its community, but the interactions under study are almost always external--the organized, resistant or self-conscious reciprocity amongst viewers, fans, groups.(Footnote 4) Votary theory, on the other hand, examines what is, to an extent, entirely theoretical and unknowable: the internal delight which a reader/spectator feels towards a work--the enthrallment, the self-forgetfulness, the merging of the reader with the author's world.

Outside of reader response criticism, which seems to trundle along entirely apart from cultural and historical considerations, theorists remain wary of promoting the individual in culture--mass, popular or otherwise. Roland Barthes, a seminal figure in the field of critical theory, considered jouissance (delight in the bodily elements of popular culture) an individualistic experience, yet ultimately saw it too as political, an "evasion of ideology," a form of resistance.(Footnote 5) Susan Bennett's attitude in her book Theatre Audiences: A Theory of Production and Reception (1990) is typical of many contemporary theorists. While defending the individual's response to the theater, she is vaguely apologetic, assuring her readers that she is concerned with experimental theater which will change people socially and politically.(Footnote 6)

Theorists seem consumed by political and sociological perspectives. "I readily grant the argument that, as consumers, readers have little control over popular culture," Hermes writes, while Janet Staigner states, "[C]ritical approaches to autonomous literary or cinematic texts" are in fact arguments over "social arrangements."(Footnote 7) Richard Butsch in his book The Making of American Audiences argues that resistance must be collective in order to matter, stating, "Indeed, all actions (and inaction) are inescapably political, in the sense that every act inevitably contributes to recreating existing conditions or to changing them."(Footnote 8) Even reader response theorists, who have drifted closest to the scorned concept of the individual, were rescued from embarrassment by Stanley Fish's philosophy of interpretative communities, which posits that people--for all their personal experiences, thoughts, reactions--emerge from a culture which imbibes them with knowledge regarding culture-specific signs, constructions, and assumptions.

Fish is not necessarily wrong. The individual as separate from society (and hence history) is a rather palpable impossibility. Nevertheless, the reluctance--the fear--of scholars towards the individual in history strikes an odd note in the study of artistic works. Absent a truly relativistic mentality, most people would agree that we are biological beings who come into this world as individual brains encased in individual skins. For theorists concerned with categorizing mental behaviors or promoting social activism, the individual experience of life may not matter. For those of us more interested in comprehending the feel, aura, ambiance and sense of an event, the individual's existence, choices and creative desires carry enormous weight. Nothing can be understood without it.

Imagine such an event: war, flood, murder. The event is comprised of many individuals--from twenties to thousands--interacting, withdrawing, complaining, dying. As they make choices, deliver decisions, state motivations--however socially crafted--they influence other choices, decisions, motivations. The event becomes a veritable swarm of interactions: letters sent, received, read. Conversations overheard, ignored. Actions avoided, taken, apologized for. As each individual moves, acts, thinks, talks, connections form. Standing above the action, we can barely decipher where connections begin or end. So we form theories. We tease out elements here, now here, now here, and draw thick lines of connection: dot-to-dot formulations. Add a few labels, words like "ideological" and "construction"--you can throw in "imperialism" just for fun--and you have a seemingly perceptive theory that will, at a superficial level, explain just about anything you want it to. Now remove the black line; look again at the intertwining, and downright messy paths of individuals at work. The dot-to-dot formulations may explain some general principles; they it may address some wide-ranging ideas, allow for basic understanding, but they will never gratify the true historian's hunger for the reality of an event. How did it feel? What was it like? How did people behave, react, think?

What creative experiences did they engage in?

Sociologists have argued, cogently, that our current cultural assumptions make it impossible for us to ever fully adopt or live inside the reality of the past. When PBS valiantly attempted to produce "real" history by placing contemporary individuals in historical settings--1900 House, Colonial House--the result was inevitably problematic. Setting alone does not determine historical behavior. The entire mindset is missing. Nevertheless, we continue to seek for that quality of understanding; in doing so, we should remember that the individuals around us, and those of the past, are not so many constructs for us to borrow at will, rearrange at our pleasure. They are people who lived, died, loved, hated, endured, and we are passionately, consumably, aware of their materiality. We want to come to terms with that materiality, to grasp objectively, emotionally in what ways the people of the past are as real as us. This is true for the humanities scholar as much as for the historian, for it is only when we allow for the reality of others (past and present) that we will realize the creative substance of artistic works. As we learn to respect the audience as individuals, we will learn to respect the works those audiences imbibed.

For me, the issue of the individual comes down to one of love. As a Mormon, I believe in the salvation of the dead; that is, I believe I can be linked to my dead ancestors through religious ceremonies and that this link will preserve both them and me in the hereafter. This link does not wipe out historical relevance. I do not picture my pioneering ancestors or--to go further back--my blacksmithing and stewarding ancestors as belonging to the same political or social milieus in which I function. The nineteenth century Kellys who left the Isle of Man for the United States and, subsequently, Utah, lived in a different world from me. At the same time, I would be disrespectful if I imagined my ancestors as less engaged by religious principles, less capable of analysis and self-perception, less interested in artistic works and the joy those works bring. If I say, "My great-grandmother was a product of her time and location; she was obviously influenced in her decisions by the ideology of American westward expansion which further promoted her self-expression as a white woman in a patriarchal society," I am not really saying anything about her at all. I haven't captured her heart, thoughts, personality, day-to-day conditions. I have set her at one remove, pigeonholed by a thick line.

Context matters; I can learn a great deal about my great-grandmother by placing her within her time--what happened to her, what was being written and performed and preached during her time period, what we know (evidentially) about the nineteenth century--but accessing the quality of my great-grandmother's experience, and the pioneer movement, calls for something more insightful than ideological labels. Focusing on results, in other words, is not the best window into the human spirit and will not, in the end, give us a true or valid image of the past or the artistic works of the past.

More effective is an approach which positions us within the historical moment (see Fig. 4); from that position, we can follow connections as they branch, multiply, end, dive into odd corners. This is not relativism; one's perception changes with one's position, but the connections--decisions made, actions taken, thoughts transcribed--however confusing, continue to exist no matter where we stand. As we follow strands of connection, we may, in strange, unexpected moments, gain a glimpse of another world. Most importantly, for the purposes of votary theory, we can follow an individual's encounter with an artistic work, and in that way, hopefully come to appreciate the energy, creativity, triumph or failure of that work within its context.

Artistic works and their audiences deserve an approach that emphasizes a work's context without bypassing the individual and the individual's creative desires. An artistic work cannot be understood without its creator or its readers/spectators. The humanities scholar should know not only the who, where, when and why of a work's history, she should seek to comprehend the creativity/spirit/reality of the work and its performance. This will not occur until the creativity/spirit/reality of the individual in relationship to that work is accepted as a given. Broad social constructs do not convey this kind of information.

Through votary theory, I postulate that the individual's relationship to the work comes down to how that individual positions him/herself inside the work. The individual is motivated to do this by a creative desire. The first tenet of votary theory is that artistic works are enjoyed by individuals within their historical contexts. The second tenet is that individuals value and desire an interior, creative experience.

The Individual's Desires

Critical theorists, while allowing for "reflexive" attitudes on the part of audiences, consistently fail to allow for the creative desire within audiences (and sometimes even within artists). Discussions of individual desires inevitably take on social or political ramifications. The creative, imaginative impulse is lost in a storm of relevance. The result is a bizarre kind of literal aesthetic whereby any argument I make for a work's creative excellence is the result of my social/cultural status while, at the same time, I am being influenced, even indoctrinated, by the work's symbols and icons. I am too literal-minded to be swept away by the aesthetics of the work (my motivations are entirely reality and power-oriented) but too artistic to be impervious to the work's aesthetic operations. And if I read the thing backwards, presumably, I'll go join the Monkeys.

Creativity, first of all, is not a specialized right-brained activity, reserved for artists, poets and performers. People want to create all kinds of things: loving families, good filing systems, decent web sites, tasty treats, well-groomed animals, a trusty lesson plan. How that desire plays out may very well be influenced by cultural environments and institutions but votary theory postulates its existence regardless of external frameworks. The creative desire like any human desire (envy, hate, love) exists throughout time and history. The modes of its expression are influenced by context but context does not determine the desire. A contemporary Shakespeare would not, perhaps, write plays (unless he teamed up with Andrew Lloyd Webber); that a contemporary Shakespeare would have creative impulses I have no doubt.(Footnote 9)

The creative desire can antedate context because it does not have to be purposeful or political in order to exist. This is not to say that writers, actors, directors do not express political, purposeful ideas in their works. But the human desire to make something is not in itself political or power-centered--useful--however contextualized. Nor, when audiences revel in a made thing, are they acting merely out of contextually relevant considerations. Yet we in the humanities seem sometimes to function (and expect the past to function) in a pale world where delight for the sake of itself has been carefully sidelined ("Well, yes, I suppose it happens."). The humanities has taken the passion out of art, reduced it to a series of political constructs and then exhibited surprise and alarm at the result: Why is everything so political and class-oriented? In an attempt to recover passion, artistic works are sometimes further reduced to a series of activist demands; context, authorial intent, is abandoned for politicized relativism. What does it matter what Milton thought--all that matters is how we feel about him, especially if what we feel will get us what we want.

Although individuals will often enter artistic productions for the express purpose of finding relevant applications, what they experience there, what they enjoy, how they enjoy it, determines whether they will return much more than a politicized argument or even a useful emotional platitude. After all, why read, go to movies, watch television at all if only the application carries weight? For C.S. Lewis and many others, the reason is transcendence. In his polemic Experiment in Criticism, Lewis writes:
Literary experience heals the wound, without undermining the privilege, of individuality. There are mass emotions which heal the wound; but they destroy the privilege. In them our separate selves are pooled and we sink back into sub-individuality. But in reading great literature I become a thousand men and yet remain myself . . . Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action and in knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more myself than when I do.(Footnote 10)
The value of a literary work lies in the introduction to a mindset unlike one's own. Wayne Booth echoes this idea in The Company We Keep, where he stresses the dialogic nature of reading. As the reader encounters the text, he develops a relationship with the author. It is the reader's duty to extend magnanimity to the text, to take as much as the text is able to impart, but also to consider what the text has to say. According to Booth, the issue at hand is not whether Huckleberry Finn, for instance, utilizes hegemonic ideologies or draws on particular interpretative structures, but whether we agree with the ideas, themes, possibilities offered us by the author.(Footnote 11)

Arnold Weinstein also emphasizes the "other" quality of artistic works: our desire, through art, to reach beyond ourselves.(Footnote 12) In his book A Scream Goes Through the House, Weinstein argues that the feelings of pain, loss, love within art connect us as human beings. Weinstein is principally interested in the effects of art. Like Joke Hermes and Booth, he envisions a citizenship surrounding artistic productions, social connectivity across space and time.(Footnote 13)

Votary theory too postulates a desire to reach beyond the self, especially a desire to create beyond the self. Readers/spectators engage in fan fiction, on-line debates, conventions, role playing and other such performances. They exchange insights over a work, extrapolate possible outcomes, reject elements of a canon story, and analyze the characters. Although these behaviors are more obvious amongst popular culture fans, such excitement is not confined to a particular "brow"--high, middle, low, academic or popular. Fascination with Dante's Inferno, Shakespeare's Hamlet or Hawthorne's House of the Seven Gables is rarely reducible to "good form" and splendid prose. We are entranced, "entangled," as Wolfgang Iser would say.(Footnote 14) We are entranced because we find ourselves wanderers in another's universe. Our entanglement there involves not only self-forgetfulness but a desire to make, complete or satisfy the requirements of that universe.(Footnote 15)

This latter claim separates votary theory from reader response. Wolfgang Iser, for instance, postulates readers who encounter blanks or gaps in an unfolding text. The blanks draw the readers in, forcing the readers to make choices. As they comply, their opinions regarding prior portions of the text are reevaluated while their decisions about future portions of the text are shaped. Reading is a linear engagement. Readers bring their personalities, opinions, plus social relations to the experience, but every response is the consequence of contact with the text.(Footnote 16) The result is a new "text" created by the reader's interaction with the author's intent (as located in the work). This "text," however intangible, is an external object, colored by "what this work means to me" and "what I got out of this experience." It is, in other words, entirely critical.(Footnote 17)

Votary theory also relies on the author's intent as found in a script, performance, book, story, poem. Unlike Iser, votary theory tackles an artistic work not as it is being processed (perhaps for the first time) or as a product of the reading/spectating experience but as it exists, within the individual's perception or memory, in its entirety. Votary theory attempts to address that moment of creative involvement in which process, and result, become supererogatory. The world of the author--whether a physical world like Middle Earth or an emotional world such as found within Kafka's cockroach--is accepted, if not fully grasped, as a whole by the reader/spectator. Within that work as a whole, readers/spectators establish a place for themselves. They become part of the author's world, consequently satisfying their creative desires.

Votary theory builds on a theory presented by C.S. Lewis in Experiment in Criticism. Lewis, like Iser, examines reading as a process. He postulates two classes, or types, of readers: those who use and those who receive. Users are those who look only for "the Event" in the book, the vicarious fulfillment of pleasure. They prefer texts that are easily personalized. Unlike users, receivers actively engage the text, reading and rereading it, giving it their whole heart and being altered because of it. "The 'recipient,'" Lewis writes, "wants to rest in [the book's content]. It is for him, at least temporarily, an end."

Lewis argues that rather than criticizing a book by its appellation--popular, highbrow, middlebrow--it should be criticized by the kind of reading or readership it engenders: receivers who enter into the work and allow that work to carry them on the journey as determined by the artist; or, users who treat the work as simply "assistance for [their] own activities," whether those activities be educational, political, social or economic. For users, texts/performances are mere manuals of self-instruction or activism; receivers, on the other hand, give themselves over to the language and world of the author. By Lewis' definition, academics can be as guilty of "using" as any romance reader while a science-fiction reader may behave as a receiver towards her genre of choice. Lewis furthermore protests against earnest readers who, in their attempt to wrest profundity from a text, fail to appreciate its humor or language.(Footnote 18)

The attractiveness of Lewis' argument is his focus on the artistic work as its own reward. Lewis resented educational approaches that reduced or "exposed" the "real" meaning behind the language of a work, thereby bypassing the work's creative offerings. In his literary analysis of Lewis, Alan Jacobs writes, "Lewis rails against [teaching skepticism rather than teaching a desire for truth], because he believes that in the long run this abdication of responsibility--the responsibility to seek knowledge--will lead to the 'abolition of man,' our transformation into a species unable ever to hear the music that Creation really does make." Here Jacobs reveals Lewis as a true formalist, with the typical Lewis' twist.(Footnote 19)

The reader/spectator of votary theory is a combination of Lewis' receiver and user. In behavior, the individual of votary theory appears like the receiver, swept along by the narrative--fearless, consenting, and generously willing to adopt the author's vision. Like the user, however, the individual rates satisfaction/fulfillment as a primary goal; he or she is not above manipulating a text (as much as it can be manipulated) or discarding texts until a good fit is found. The reader/spectator of votary theory is searching for a home, a place wherein to work out the creative desire. The importance of the work as a whole in this search cannot be underestimated. Creativity does not, as so many college freshmen seem to think, entail a lack of discipline. Once I am inside a work, I am held to its structure. I make a place for myself, but I cannot simply transform the work into a pliable piece of self-involvement. Whether or not I know the original author's intent, I am constrained by the work's shape as I am constrained by the shape of my living quarters. I may decorate my studio apartment according to my personal whims; I cannot alter the age or structure of the house in which my apartment resides--not without changing it, irrevocably, into something else. This forced organization is, to a great extent, the appeal of artistic works: I exercise my creativity within the confines of another mind.(Footnote 20)

Without understanding this desire, and the homes in which it roosts, much of our culture is practically (in the practical sense) incomprehensible. To a greater or lesser extent, we all--readers, spectators and artists--search beyond ourselves, partly for self-definition but also for self-production. Our participation in a book, movie, poem, television show enables us to make some thing. Our participation is personal, hands-on, engaged; yet, it is also objective and inventive.

Votary Theory as Tool

Votary theory begins with the reality of the individual; it postulates a creative desire on the part of that individual. Votary theory then suggests that a fundamental element of audience enjoyment is the ability of individuals to create inside an artistic work. We are not simply all voyeuristically bent on satisfying social needs: power, status, change. We desire to create; we exercise our desire through our own creations and within the works of others. Votary theory further suggests that this desire is fundamental to the human experience; without it, no artistic work can truly be understood.

Votary theory is a tool which brings together factors which, in the humanities, are too often held apart. The job of the humanities scholar is to understand artistic works, both their contexts (container) and their content (creative essence). A good scholar should never abandon context entirely for content; on the other hand, humanities scholars are often so busy dismantling texts in the search for context (or, rather, culture), they fail to be readers/spectators and enjoy the content. They forget, and sometimes even belittle, the staggering grandeur of artistic works: the poetic language, the well-crafted scene, the thoughtful characterization. Votary theory submits an approach that applies context without reducing works to mere contextual productions. As in religion, as in love, as in any transcendent moment, something else is going on.

To that end, votary theory presents three questions which will enable the humanities scholar to reach a complete understanding of an artistic work: 1. What is the historical context? What do we know about the time and place in which this work was generated? What do we know about the author and the author's intent?

2. What would readers/spectators have encountered when they engaged the work? What ambiance surrounded it? How was it treated by critics, other reviewers? How was it produced? Advertised?

3. Within a historical context (Question 1), faced with a particular form of engagement (Question 2), how might readers/spectators have exercised their creative desires? How might they have made a place for themselves within a work?

In answering the last question, humanities scholars will hopefully learn to appreciate artistic works at the creative level. Once individuals enter a work, we must rely on our glimpse--our sense--of their experience there. In its final stages, votary theory is entirely theoretical. In many cases, it is simply not possible to interview long-dead spectators, peppering them with surveys about their imaginative desires. Nor would such an approach be entirely appropriate (although it could certainly be done with a contemporary audience). Votary theory attempts to combine a moment in time (scene of a play, page of a book) with that moment's aura or quality (the creative desire flowing between the participant and the work). Many reader/spectator response surveys focus on the meaning or impact of a work to an individual after the event; the issue of creative excitement is rarely addressed; it is uncertain that it could be. As a teacher of English Composition, I have learned that artistic enjoyment is not always communicable. "I liked the characters," students tell me as we wrestle over literary analysis essays. "Why?" I ask, fully armed with my humanist analytical training. They don't know. They're not sure. They tell me how they feel, and I translate their language into a passable thesis. But I am aware, as they are, that my language may not be entirely accurate. Creative involvement is an elusive experience.

Consequently, the efficacy of votary theory is best proved through application. I have selected two works: The Duchess of Malfi by John Webster and the film, Late for Dinner. Both works are relevant to the American landscape and will be examined within that context. The Duchess of Malfi, although written circa 1612 by Englishman John Webster, did not appear in America until the mid-nineteenth century. It was performed sporadically on and off Broadway for the next 100 years. I will examine it specifically within the context of its 1946 production in New York City and will introduce an imagined 1946 spectator as part of votary theory application.

Late for Dinner is a more recent Hollywood film (1991) which uses cryonics as its central plot device. Although cryonics is a world-wide cause, the United States contains the largest number of cryonics organizations and the only cryonics organizations that freeze people. I will be examining the film as it might be examined by a future humanities scholar. The creative experience of a Late for Dinner spectator at the moment of engagement will be presented.

The fourth chapter of my thesis will also concern an artistic work, The Last Promise by Richard Paul Evans. In this chapter, I will examine the relationship between language and votary theory. One of the overwhelming worries of critical theory, especially those theories which excise creativity from the artistic equation, is the power of language and aesthetic enjoyment. These worries are not only held by members of the academic elite. The Last Promise was removed from LDS-run bookstores for its possible negative influence on Mormon readers. I will address the issue within the context of Mormonism and as an active Mormon but will present votary theory as a tool that renders these fears irrelevant for the humanities scholar. In this chapter, the possibility of individual audience interviews will be tackled in more detail.

Votary theory does not answer all the problems encountered by the humanities scholar, who seeks to understand a work's context as well as its creative essence. Rather, votary theory functions as one possible approach, a position within the strands of human connection. It is an enlightenment tool, but it works precisely because it does not insist that enlightened messages must be embedded in artistic works or that artistic works must be linked to enlightened theories. Individuals of the past or present do not need to see what we see (or want to see) in order for us to credit their experiences. Their motives do not need to be ideological, powerful or historically significant in order to be of merit. Creativity is a good enough reason to study a work. More than anything, votary theory is an attempt to restore balance to the study of artistic works. We need to drag our appreciation of such works away from their enslavement to hegemonies and hidden messages to a more holistic, and wholesome, position. The study of power has some merit, but in its demand for attention, the individual's creative desire is often bypassed, shoveled off to the side. Votary theory wishes to restore that desire to a position of respect.

1. Dana Polan, "Brief Encounters: Mass Culture and the Evacuation of Sense" in Studies in Entertainment: Critical Approaches to Mass Culture, ed. Tania Modleski (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 167.

2. Barthes' approach is summed up in John Fiske's Understanding Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 1989), 54-55. Comments about the Catch-22 exhibited by theorists, who attack Western culture while relying on it, arise in several contexts. Dana Polan in "Brief Encounters" states, "[B]oth Kaminsky and Eizykman share in the ideological binary opposition of mass culture and avant-garde culture," pointing out that despite their differing analysis, the two critics depend on the same assumption that "mass culture is essentially the regime of content, theme, the formulaic regularity of simple explanatory myths, an art tied to the givens of an everyday world," 168. In an essay from the same book, Tania Modleski warns against feminist scholars who attack the dominant ideology; she points out that women, in many artistic contexts, are connected with the dominant ideology: to attack the dominant ideology in art will be to attack women. "The Terror of Pleasure: The Contemporary Horror Film and Postmodern Theory," 163-164. Although these criticisms of postmodernism are recent, the Catch-22 of postmodernism was acknowledged early on. In a 1930s English murder mystery by Dorothy Sayers, her detective, Peter Wimsey encounters a group of Marxist musicians who promote a "soul of rebellion" in their music. Another spectator scoffs; their "Bourgeois music [has] "resolution at the back of all [its] discords . . . Till you can cast away the octave and its sentimental associations, you walk in fetters of convention." Ever obliging, Wimsey agrees: "That's the spirit. I would dispense with all definite notes . . . It is only man, trammeled by a stultifying convention--" at which point Wimsey has to go solve the murder. It is just as well. As Wimsey fully knows, if his suggestion were taken, it would do away with the discussion, not to mention the music. Critical attacks on conventions must beware, else in banishing all forms of convention, they banish themselves as well. Dorothy Sayers, Strong Poison (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 84.

3. Joke Hermes, Re-reading Popular Culture (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 8.

4. Butsch, for example, argues against the idea that audiences are passive, unable to "manage mass media." Richard Bustch, The Making of American Audiences: From Stage to Television, 1750-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 280. Mukerji and Schudson point out that Marxist-influenced theories tend to "obscure the complex ways people make sense of and use their tastes" in Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspective in Cultural Studies, Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 34. Janet Staigner argues that "scholars may get further in analyses once they stop assuming that individuals have one, logical relation to the movies." Jane Staigner, Interpreting Films: Studies in the Historical Reception of American Cinema (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 12. However, Staigner also argues that individual agency is a nineteenth/twentieth century concept and relies on Stanley Fish's theory of interpretive frames.

5. Fiske, 50.

6. Susan Bennett, Theatre Audiences: A Theory of Production and Reception (New York: Routledge, 1990), 177-182.

7. Hermes, vii; Staigner, 210-211.

8. Butsch, 292.

9. It is likely, for instance, that Beatrix Potter never would have written a word if she had not wanted a life independent from her parents. The creative desire, which emerged in her watercolors and stories, may simply have found a different outlet--as it did in her later life, when she focused all her energies on her farm.

10. C.S. Lewis, An Experiment in Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 140-141.

11. Wayne Booth, The Company We Keep (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 135.

12. In fact, an encounter with the "Other" (another world, mindset, set of experiences) is a recurring refrain in writers as diverse as C.S. Lewis, Kathleen Rooney, Wayne Booth, Camille Paglia, Dorothy Sayers, Umberto Eco, Alberto Manguel. Votary theory postulates that (1) this experience, encounter, is not limited to authors and critics, they just happen to be more articulate when it comes to explaining it; (2) the experience is often perceived as a result rather a moment of creative engagement; votary theory examines the moment.

13. Arnold Weinstein, A Scream Goes Through the House (New York: Random House, 1988), xxi.

14. Wolfgang Iser, "The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach," in Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, ed. Jane Tompkins (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), 65.

15. A great deal of fan fiction takes place "off-screen," that is, during periods of time not covered by the original text (book or television series), either during the summer (when television series go into re-runs) or after a series (book or television) has ended. Although the fan fiction contains "off-screen" material, it is often measured (by fellow fans) by how well the writer has captured the characters as determined by the original text. Has the fan writer remained true to the author's universe, vision?

16. Iser, 54.

17. Similarly, certain types of criticism produce creations, new texts, themselves. The object of votary theory, however, is to examine the creative desire not in its parasitic use of works but in its symbolic conjunction with works.

18. Lewis, 88-89.

19. Alan Jacobs, The Narnian: The Life and Imagination of C.S. Lewis (San Francisco: Harper, 2005), 174, emphasis in text. Lewis' art for art's sake stance never descended into an attack on popular culture. He did detest modern poetry, for almost unfathomable reasons, but in general he could be surprisingly non-elitist.

20. The image of reader/spectator inside the artist's world is not a new concept. The issues of distance and connection bridge both literary and performance theory; film and theater scholars often refer back to critical and reader response theories, applying similar concepts and rules to various types of production. Daphna Ben Chaim goes so far as to compare novels, film and theatre. In the film and the novel, the narrative is controlled by a point of view. The reader/spectator of a novel/film has to make a more concerted effort to climb inside the story, to see it from another perspective, than the spectator of a play. Yet Ben Chaim argues that the experience of the theater compared to film is "really one of differing degrees, not of opposition." We can apply the same generous attitude to texts. After all, like the play and film, a novel cannot be enjoyed until it is engaged. All artistic works, to an extent, rely on an appreciative (or angry) participant. Daphna Ben Chaim, Distance in the Theatre: The Aesthetics of Audience Response (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1984), 56.